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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Ronald E. Gillette seeks to intervene in this 
twenty-eight year old litigation between the United States and 
the Territory of the Virgin Islands (collectively, “Appellees”).  
At issue are the conditions in the Golden Grove Adult 
Correctional Facility (“Golden Grove”), which is located on 
St. Croix.  Both the United States and Gillette, who is 
incarcerated at Golden Grove, seek to improve conditions at 
the facility that allegedly fall below the minimum standards 
required by the United States Constitution.  Because we 
conclude that the United States adequately represents 
Gillette’s interests in this case and that Appellees will be 
prejudiced if intervention is permitted, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order denying his motion to intervene.   
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I. 
A. 
 This litigation began in 1986 when the United States 
sued the Virgin Islands pursuant to the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, 
seeking to enjoin the Virgin Islands from allegedly depriving 
inmates at Golden Grove of their Eighth Amendment rights.
1
  
That same year, Appellees entered into a Consent Decree, 
which provided that the Virgin Islands would attempt to 
remedy the conditions at Golden Grove.  The Consent Decree 
recognized the need to protect inmates from “‘unreasonable 
fire safety risks to their lives and safety’ and ‘wanton and 
reckless physical violence by other inmates or staff,’ as well 
as providing ‘minimally adequate sanitation to protect 
inmates from unreasonable risks to their physical health’ and 
‘minimally adequate medical care for the serious medical 
needs of inmates.’”  App. at 63 (quoting the Consent Decree 
at 3-4).   
Following entry of the Consent Decree, Appellees 
continued to litigate over the conditions at Golden Grove.  
The District Court entered several additional orders when the 
conditions at Golden Grove failed to improve according to 
plan, including a 1990 Plan of Compliance, a 2003 Stipulated 
Agreement, a 2007 Remedial Order, and three additional 
                                              
1
 Documents related to this case filed prior to February 
1996, including the complaint, are not available 
electronically.  The historical facts of this case are largely 
undisputed and are therefore taken from the District Court’s 
opinions dated February 8, 2012 (App. at 61-91) and 
November 7, 2012 (App. at 7-16), along with the parties’ 
briefs. 
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orders in December 2009, February 2010, and December 
2010.  The ongoing litigation relates in large part to the 
Virgin Islands’ compliance with the Consent Decree and 
these subsequent orders. 
In July 2011, the Virgin Islands filed a motion to 
terminate prospective relief pursuant to the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b), (e).  Upon the 
filing of the motion to terminate, the automatic stay 
provisions of the PLRA operated to stay the District Court’s 
orders pending a hearing on the motion and its resolution.  In 
approximately September 2011, the parties began discovery 
regarding conditions at Golden Grove in preparation for 
further litigation, while at the same time engaging in 
settlement negotiations.  By opinion dated February 8, 2012, 
the District Court concluded that all but one of the orders 
entered after the 1986 Consent Decree constituted prospective 
relief under the PLRA, and that those orders did not include 
the findings required under the statute.  The District Court 
ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
“prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and 
ongoing violation of a federal right at Golden Grove under § 
3626(b)(3) of the PLRA, and, if so, to ensure that the 
prospective relief is narrowly tailored to that violation in the 
manner required by the PLRA.”  App. at 62.   
 
 
B. 
 Gillette is a prisoner at Golden Grove who is no 
stranger to this Court.  He was convicted on April 11, 2008 of 
several territorial crimes and sentenced to 300 months’ 
imprisonment on June 19, 2009.  Gillette filed a timely appeal 
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of his sentence with this Court on June 22, 2009.
2
  He also 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 in the District Court on January 31, 2012.  In 
his habeas petition Gillette cited extensively to statements 
made by the United States in its pleadings in the present 
litigation.  Those statements list the alleged unconstitutional 
conditions at Golden Grove.  See Supp. App. at 3-7.  The 
District Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Gillette’s habeas petition and dismissed it sua sponte, 
concluding that the petition should have been brought as a 
civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The denial of 
Gillette’s habeas petition is currently pending before this 
Court.  See Gillette v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, No. 13-
2530, -- F. App’x -- (3d Cir. Apr. 11, 2014).  
Gillette filed a motion to intervene in the present case 
on July 21, 2012, one day after the United States filed a 
motion to dismiss his habeas petition.  Gillette’s motion 
sought leave to intervene as of right pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 24(a), or, in the alternative, for permissive 
intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b).  Gillette argued that:  (1) 
as an inmate at Golden Grove, he had a cognizable interest in 
the subject of the litigation; (2) his interests would be 
impaired if he were not permitted to intervene; (3) the United 
                                              
2
 Gillette sought to voluntarily withdraw the direct 
appeal of his criminal conviction despite counsel’s objection, 
and this Court remanded to the District Court for a 
determination of Gillette’s competency to withdraw his 
appeal.  Following a hearing, the District Court concluded 
that Gillette was not competent to do so, and the direct appeal 
was argued on April 24, 2013.  We rendered a decision 
affirming his conviction on December 6, 2013.  United States 
v. Gillette, 738 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 2013).   
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States will not adequately represent his interests in the 
litigation; and (4) his motion to intervene was timely.  
Gillette’s memorandum in support of the motion extensively 
quoted the representations about the conditions at Golden 
Grove made by the United States in this case.  Both Appellees 
responded to Gillette’s motion.      
The District Court denied Gillette’s motion to 
intervene by order dated November 7, 2012.
3
  The 
accompanying memorandum opinion concluded that the 
motion to intervene as of right failed for two independent 
reasons.  First, the motion was untimely because of: (a) the 
advanced stage of the proceedings; (b) the prejudice to the 
parties caused by permitting intervention on the eve of 
settlement (the District Court was informed that the parties 
had reached a settlement only twelve days after Gillette’s 
motion was fully briefed); and (c) the lack of a good reason 
for Gillette’s delay in seeking to intervene.  Second, Gillette 
failed to establish that the United States would not adequately 
represent his interests, particularly in light of his extensive 
reliance on the United States’ pleadings in outlining his 
grievances about Golden Grove.  The District Court denied 
Gillette’s motion for permissive intervention for “the same 
reasons” that it denied the motion to intervene as of right.  
App. at 16.   
By the time the District Court denied Gillette’s motion, 
Appellees had already submitted a proposed Settlement 
Agreement to the District Court on August 31, 2012.  The 
Settlement Agreement identifies ways to remedy the deficient 
conditions at Golden Grove in the areas of:  (1) medical and 
mental health care; (2) inmate safety and supervision 
                                              
3
 Gillette timely filed a notice of appeal of the District 
Court’s order on November 14, 2012. 
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(including classification of inmates for housing and use of 
force policies); (3) fire and life safety; (4) environmental 
health conditions (including housekeeping, sanitation, and 
physical plant conditions); and (5) training of Golden Grove 
staff.  Most relevant to the present case, the Settlement 
Agreement included detailed provisions related to medical 
and mental health care, “including screening, assessment, 
treatment, and monitoring of prisoners’ medical and mental 
health needs.”  App. at 232-34.  The District Court ordered 
further briefing with respect to a dispute over the selection of 
an appropriate monitor, but on May 14, 2013, it entered an 
order adopting the United States’ proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in support of the Settlement 
Agreement, granted the Appellees’ joint motion to enter 
consent judgment, and accepted the Settlement Agreement.   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 
U.S.C. § 1612 and 42 U.S.C. § 1997a.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the denial of a 
motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 for abuse of 
discretion.  Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 
1987).  “We note, however, that our review of district court’s 
[sic] decisions denying intervention of right is more stringent 
than the abuse of discretion review accorded to denials of 
motions for permissive intervention.”  Id.  A district court’s 
denial of a motion pursuant to Rule 24(a) may be reversed “if 
the [district] court ‘has applied an improper legal standard or 
reached a decision that we are confident is incorrect.’”  Id. 
(quoting United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 
749 F.2d 968, 992 (2d Cir. 1984)).  We are, however, “more 
reluctant to intrude into the highly discretionary decision of 
whether to grant permissive intervention.”  Brody ex rel. 
Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992).   
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III. 
Rule 24 provides for intervention as a matter of right 
and permissive intervention.  Because Gillette’s motion 
sought each in the alternative,  we will discuss them both in 
turn. 
A. 
1. 
 Intervention as of right must be granted when a party 
“claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that 
is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of 
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties 
adequately represent that interest.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).  
A potential intervenor must satisfy four criteria to succeed on 
a motion pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2):  “(1) the application for 
intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient 
interest in the litigation; (3) the interest may be affected or 
impaired, as a practical matter by the disposition of the 
action; and (4) the interest is not adequately represented by an 
existing party in the litigation.”  Harris, 820 F.2d at 596 
(citing Commw. of Pa. v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 504 (3d Cir. 
1976)).  “Although these requirements are intertwined, each 
must be met to intervene as of right.”  Id. (citing New Orleans 
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 
463 (5th Cir. 1984)).  Intervention as a matter of right 
presents a situation where “[t]he facts assume overwhelming 
importance in [the] decision.”  Kleissler v. United States 
Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1998).   
Under the facts of this case, the District Court found 
that Gillette satisfied the sufficiency of interest and 
impairment of interest elements.  Gillette challenges the 
District Court’s determination to the extent it found that he 
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failed to meet the timeliness and adequacy of representation 
elements.  We need only address the latter element to affirm 
the District Court’s conclusion in this case.  See Harris, 820 
F.2d at 596 (requiring that each element be met before 
intervention is proper). 
2. 
 The adequacy of representation element requires the 
applicant to demonstrate “‘that his interests are not 
adequately represented by the existing parties.’”  Brody, 957 
F.2d at 1123 (quoting Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133, 
1135 (3d Cir. 1982)).  Inadequate representation can be based 
on any of three possible grounds:  “(1) that although the 
applicant’s interests are similar to those of a party, they 
diverge sufficiently that the existing party cannot devote 
proper attention to the applicant’s interests; (2) that there is 
collusion between the representative party and the opposing 
party; or (3) that the representative party is not diligently 
prosecuting the suit.”4  Id.  A presumption of adequacy 
attaches, however, “if one party is a government entity 
charged by law with representing the interests of the applicant 
for intervention.”  Id. (citing Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for 
                                              
4
 Although the District Court concluded that Gillette 
failed to establish any of the three grounds for adequacy of 
interest, Gillette’s challenge on appeal appears to only relate 
to the first ground; i.e. that his interests diverge from those of 
the United States.  See Appellant’s Br. at 23-26.  Because 
Gillette makes at most only a passing reference to the other 
two factors in his opening brief, those arguments are waived.  
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler 
Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 389 (3d Cir. 1994).  In any event, 
there does not appear to be any evidence of collusion or lack 
of diligence in this case. 
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Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 970, 973 (3d Cir. 1982)).  
In such an instance, a potential intervenor can only overcome 
the presumption and thereby intervene by making a 
“‘compelling showing . . . to demonstrate why [the 
government’s] representation is not adequate.’”  Mountain 
Top Condo. Ass’n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 
F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 7C Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1909 (1986)).  Gillette failed to make such a showing here. 
 The United States argues correctly that the 
presumption of adequate representation applies to this case, 
since CRIPA gives the Attorney General the authority to 
enforce its provisions: 
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable 
cause to believe that any State
[5]
 or . . . official, 
employee, or agent thereof . . . is subjecting 
persons residing in or confined to an institution 
. . . to egregious or flagrant conditions which 
deprive such persons of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States 
causing such persons to suffer grievous harm . . 
. the Attorney General, for or in the name of the 
United States, may institute a civil action in any 
appropriate United States district court against 
such party . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) (emphasis added).  The United States 
relied on CRIPA when it filed suit in 1986 to combat the 
                                              
5
 “State” is defined for purposes of § 1997 as including 
territories of the United States.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(4). 
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allegedly unconstitutional conditions at Golden Grove.  
Because that statute authorizes the Attorney General to 
pursue civil rights actions on behalf of prisoners who are 
suffering deprivations of their constitutional rights, we 
presume that the United States adequately represents the 
interests of those prisoners.  Brody, 957 F.2d at 1123.  Gillette 
therefore must make a “compelling showing” as to why his 
interests are not so represented.  Mountain Top Condo., 72 
F.3d at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3. 
Gillette relies on two decisions in an effort to show 
that he satisfied his burden in this case:  Kleissler, and United 
States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 636 (9th Cir. 1988).  
Kleissler addressed a district court’s denial of a motion to 
intervene filed by “local governmental bodies and business 
concerns in litigation brought by environmentalists to restrict 
logging activities in a National Forest.”  157 F.3d at 967.  The 
plaintiffs in the underlying suit challenged, on environmental 
conservation grounds, the use of a logging practice known as 
“even-aged management.”  Id. at 968 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The challenged logging projects, which were 
approved by the Forest Service, “called for substantial tree 
harvesting . . . [and] contemplate[d] clearing designated areas 
of all trees, rather than focusing on individual trees within the 
given tract, the latter being far more costly and time-
consuming for timber companies.”  Id.   
The proposed intervenors included local area school 
districts and municipalities that asserted a financial interest in 
the suit “because they receive[d] funds from receipts of 
logging operations in the forest.”  Id.  Those funds were used 
by the municipalities and school districts for public schools 
and roads.  Id.  Several timber companies also sought to 
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intervene on the grounds that they:  (1) held timber contracts 
in the forest; (2) were successful bidders on timber contracts; 
or (3) generated most of their income from timber contracts 
with the Forest Service.  Id.  The district court denied the 
motions to intervene by all but two of the timber companies 
because those two parties’ existing timber contract rights 
would have been threatened if the plaintiffs prevailed.  Id.  
The district court also denied the motions to intervene filed 
by the school districts and municipalities.  Id.   
On appeal, we acknowledged the presumption that the 
government will adequately represent the concerns of a 
proposed intervenor.  Id. at 972.  We also noted, however, 
that “when an agency’s views are necessarily colored by its 
view of the public welfare rather than the more parochial 
views of a proposed intervenor whose interest is personal to 
it, the burden [for proving the right to intervention] is 
comparatively light.”  Id.  In light of that lower burden, we 
concluded that the relief the plaintiffs sought in the 
underlying suit “would have an immediate, adverse financial 
effect on the school districts and municipalities,” and that all 
proposed intervenors had a direct economic interest in the 
litigation.  Id.  at 972 (recognizing that “the polestar for 
evaluating a claim for intervention is always whether the 
proposed intervenor’s interest is direct or remote”).   
Ultimately, we noted that the potential intervenors’ 
interests contrasted with those of the government, which 
represented 
numerous complex and conflicting interests in 
matters of this nature.  The straightforward 
business interests asserted by intervenors here 
may become lost in the thicket of sometimes 
inconsistent governmental policies. . . . 
 14 
Although it is unlikely that the intervenors’ 
economic interest will change, it is not realistic 
to assume that the [government’s] programs 
will remain static or unaffected by unanticipated 
policy shifts.   
 
Id. at 973-74 (citations omitted).  Intervention was therefore 
proper based on the conflict between the intervenors’ direct 
economic interests and the government’s shifting public 
policy interests (which included balancing, at least in part, 
economic gain from timber harvesting with the need to 
preserve the environment).  Id. at 974.   
In articulating his asserted interests in this case, 
Gillette’s memorandum in support of the motion to intervene 
demonstrates a substantial overlap between his interests and 
those of the United States.  Specifically, Gillette extensively 
quotes from the United States’ pleadings in this case, 
indicating that Golden Grove has: 
“failed to:  1) [p]rovide inmates with ‘minimally 
adequate medical care for their serious medical 
needs;’ 2) [p]rotect prisoners from 
‘unreasonable fire safety risks to their lives and 
safety;’ 3) [a]fford the necessary staff 
supervision and security to protect inmates from 
‘wanton and reckless physical violence by other 
inmates or staff;’ and 4) [p]rovide ‘minimally 
adequate sanitation to protect inmates from 
unreasonable risks to their physical health.’”   
 
App. at 108-09 (quoting the District Court’s February 8, 2012 
opinion, which in turn quotes the United States’ complaint in 
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this case) (emphasis and alteration in original).  This reliance 
upon the United States’ pleadings belies Gillette’s argument 
that his interests diverge from those of the United States.  In 
fact, as discussed above, his grievances dovetail with the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement in this case.  To that end, 
Gillette’s interests not only overlap with those of the United 
States, they are essentially identical.   
Gillette’s reliance upon Kleissler is misplaced because 
the proposed intervenors in that case all had a singular, direct 
financial stake in the underlying litigation that was 
necessarily in tension with the “thicket of sometimes 
inconsistent [Forest Service] policies.”  157 F.3d at 974.  In 
that case, the conflict arose from the Forest Service’s broad 
public policy goals, specifically those related to conserving 
and protecting the environment.  Id.  The potential 
intervenors’ financial interests were more limited and thus in 
tension with those of the government.  Gillette fails to 
demonstrate a similar conflict here and instead relies almost 
exclusively upon the United States’ allegations in defining the 
scope of his own.  Even though the United States seeks to 
secure changes at Golden Grove on a number of levels, its 
ultimate goal is to achieve constitutionally required 
conditions at the facility.  Gillette shares that goal, and does 
not argue that any of the sought improvements would be 
antithetical to his personal interests—indeed, he listed most of 
them in his motion.   
Gillette argues that negotiations between the Virgin 
Islands and the United States will necessarily involve some 
balancing, and likens the problems at Golden Grove and their 
resolution in the Settlement Agreement to “‘a spider web, in 
which the tension of the various strands is determined by the 
relationship among all the parts of the web, so that if one 
pulls on a single strand, the tension of the entire web is 
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redistributed in a new and complex pattern.’”  Appellant’s 
Reply Br. at 13 (quoting Brown v. Plata, --U.S.--, --, 131 S. 
Ct. 1910, 1937 (2011)).  The metaphor recognizes that there 
are many issues to be addressed at Golden Grove, with 
medical and mental health care being only one component.  
While this point is well-taken, it does not change the 
underlying fact that Gillette is challenging the 
constitutionality of the conditions at Golden Grove and that 
the United States is charged by law with securing the same.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a).  The fact that the United States 
may seek broader changes in the Settlement Agreement than 
those sought by Gillette, however, is more akin to a 
“difference of opinion concerning the tactics with which the 
litigation should be handled [and] does not make inadequate 
the representation of those whose interests are identical with 
that of an existing party.”  Wright & Miller, supra, at § 1909.  
This tactical give-and-take identified by Gillette, however, 
must ultimately survive constitutional scrutiny under the 
PLRA in this case.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) 
(recognizing that prospective relief under the PLRA is not 
available unless “the court finds that such relief is narrowly 
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the 
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right”).  
Unlike in Kleissler, therefore, shifting policy considerations 
are less of a concern when constitutionally guaranteed rights 
are at stake.   
A more analogous case is United States v. City of Los 
Angeles, in which community groups and individual 
community members appealed the denial of a motion to 
intervene as of right.  288 F.3d 391, 396-97 (9th Cir. 2002).  
The underlying litigation involved allegations by the United 
States that the city and its police department “engaged in a 
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pattern or practice of depriving individuals of constitutional 
rights through the use of excessive force, false arrests and 
improper searches and seizures . . . .”  Id. at 396.  The 
individual community members seeking to intervene 
“submitted uncontroverted declarations stating that they [had] 
suffered from, and [were] likely to continue [suffering] from, 
the unconstitutional police misconduct that form[ed] the basis 
of the United States’ suit against the City.”  Id. at 397 
(emphasis added).  In concluding that the district court 
properly denied the motion to intervene as of right, the court 
of appeals acknowledged the presumption that the United 
States would adequately protect the proposed intervenors’ 
interests.  Id. at 402.  Specifically, the court noted that “both 
the individual and organizational community members are the 
exact constituents the United States is seeking to protect in 
this action.  Thus, this case is not like Forest Conservation 
Council, in which the intervention applicants had ‘more 
narrow, parochial interests’ than did the existing government 
plaintiff.”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Forest Conservation 
Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 (9th Cir. 
1995)).   
Like in City of Los Angeles, Gillette’s argument that 
his interests diverge from those of the United States is not 
persuasive because he, as an inmate at Golden Grove, is the 
“exact constituent” the United States is attempting to protect 
in this case.  Id.  Like the United States, Gillette simply 
wishes to “ensure that [the Settlement Agreement] is strictly 
enforced.  Thus, [he shares] the same objective as the United 
States.  Any differences [he may have] are merely differences 
in strategy, which are not enough to justify intervention.”  Id.  
The mere fact that he is but one individual while the United 
States is seeking systemic change at Golden Grove is not 
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relevant under the facts of this case, since their interests are 
not in conflict—as was the case in Kleissler.   
Gillette relies upon a second case, United States v. 
Oregon, in which individual residents of a state-run 
institution sought to intervene in an action brought under 
CRIPA “claiming failure to provide minimally adequate 
training, medical care, sanitation and trained staff.”  839 F.2d 
at 636.  In addressing whether the proposed intervenors’ 
interests were adequately represented, the court noted that  
the applicants set forth claims for injunctive and 
other relief affording residents of the facility 
access to better conditions in the facility, 
sufficient training in self-care skills and 
sufficient community-based programs to insure 
freedom from unnecessary institutionalization. . 
. . The government has limited its complaint to 
seeking injunctive relief for the more 
outrageous conditions existing within the 
facility. 
   
Id. at 637-38.  Although the court acknowledged that both the 
United States and the potential intervenors shared the “goal of 
vindicating the constitutional rights of [the] residents,” the 
difference in the scope of the relief sought required 
intervention.  Id. at 638.   
In this case, it is clear that no such difference in scope 
exists because Gillette expressly relied upon the United 
States’ pleadings, as discussed above.  If anything, the scope 
of changes sought by the United States in this case is broader 
than Gillette’s individual complaints, because his specific 
grievances are largely limited to the availability of 
constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care.  
 19 
The United States, on the other hand, seeks systemic change 
at Golden Grove that will ensure constitutional conditions for 
all inmates.  In that sense, Gillette is likely to reap even 
greater benefits as a result of the United States’ 
representation.
6
   
In light of the above, we conclude that Kleissler and 
United States v. Oregon do not apply where, as here, a 
government agency has both a constitutional interest in and 
the statutory authority to seek systemic change that will 
ultimately provide an individual intervenor with an even 
greater benefit than that originally sought.  In such cases, the 
“personal” and “parochial views” of the proposed intervenor 
align with the constitutional interests of the particular 
government agency, Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972, and 
intervention as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a) is not 
appropriate. 
B. 
 Rule 24(b) provides that a “court may permit anyone 
to intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with 
                                              
6
 We note also that United States v. Oregon is of 
questionable reliability in light of our Court’s precedent.  
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit applied a de novo standard of 
review and did not apply the presumption in favor of 
adequate representation.  839 F.2d at 637 (citing In re Benny, 
791 F.2d 712, 721 (9th Cir. 1986)).  As discussed above, we 
apply a presumption of adequacy when the United States is 
charged with protecting the applicant’s rights.  Brody, 957 
F.2d at 1123.  We also apply a more deferential abuse of 
discretion review to motions to intervene.  Id. at 1115.  In 
light of these facts, United States v. Oregon is easily 
distinguishable and is not persuasive. 
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the main action a common question of law or fact.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).  “In exercising its discretion, the [district 
court] must consider whether the intervention will unduly 
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ 
rights.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).  As already noted, district 
courts have broader discretion in making a determination 
about whether permissive intervention is appropriate as 
opposed to intervention as of right.  Brody, 957 F.2d at 1115. 
The District Court in this case denied Gillette’s Rule 
24(b) permissive intervention motion for the same reasons it 
denied the motion pursuant to Rule 24(a).  Specifically, it 
noted that Gillette’s motion “[was] untimely, would delay 
litigation and prejudice the parties, and his intervention [was] 
unnecessary given that the United States adequately 
represents his interests in this matter.”  App. at 16.  In light of 
our deferential standard of review, we agree with the District 
Court that Appellees would be prejudiced by allowing 
Gillette to intervene at this time (and need not delve into the 
District Court’s other reasons). 
Courts have recognized that prejudice can result when 
a party seeks to intervene at a late point in litigation.  In 
United States v. Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
denial of a motion to intervene as of right where the parties 
had negotiated a tentative settlement agreement involving 
complicated issues related to unconstitutional conditions at 
state facilities, but where the district court had not yet 
approved the final settlement agreement.  260 F.3d 587, 591-
92 (6th Cir. 2001) (addressing whether the existing parties to 
the litigation would be prejudiced by allowing intervention 
pursuant to Rule 24(a)).  The district court concluded that the 
intervenor’s participation vis-a-vis the remedial policies in the 
settlement agreement could prejudice the parties by leading to 
collateral litigation.  Id. at 594.  Likewise, in D’Amato v. 
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Deutsche Bank, the Second Circuit agreed with the district 
court that, among other reasons for denying a motion to 
intervene, “late intervention would potentially derail the 
settlement and prejudice the existing parties, who had been 
engaging in settlement negotiations for several months.”  236 
F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (intervenor sought to challenge the 
adequacy of a settlement and add defendants to the action by 
motion filed three days before a scheduled fairness hearing).   
Appellees in the present case would be prejudiced if 
forced to engage in further litigation in response to Gillette’s 
potential objections to the Settlement Agreement, particularly 
in light of this case’s lengthy history.  See Tennessee, 260 
F.3d at 592.  That prejudice is further compounded by the fact 
that Gillette’s intervention is unnecessary due to the United 
States’ adequate representation in the ongoing litigation.  
Intervention at this stage would therefore result in the 
duplication of effort that is unnecessary and unwarranted.  
We accordingly conclude that the District Court properly 
exercised its discretion by denying Gillette’s motion for 
permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b).  See Brody, 
957 F.2d at 1124 (“[I]f intervention as of right is not 
available, the same reasoning would indicate that it would not 
be an abuse of discretion to deny permissive intervention as 
well.”).   
IV. 
Gillette’s interests in this litigation are nearly identical 
with those of the United States and he fails to make a 
compelling showing that his interests are not being 
adequately represented by the United States.  We therefore 
affirm the District Court’s denial of Gillette’s motion to 
intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a).  We likewise find 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
 22 
Gillette’s motion pursuant to Rule 24(b) because Appellees 
would be prejudiced by permitting intervention at this stage in 
the litigation.
7
  We therefore affirm. 
 
                                              
7
 In light of our conclusions, we affirm the District 
Court’s denial of Gillette’s motions.  We note, however, that 
our holding today leaves open the possibility, albeit remote, 
that the United States’ position would change so drastically in 
relation to Gillette’s interests as to justify intervention.  In 
such a circumstance, Gillette would need to clear an even 
higher hurdle by demonstrating that “extraordinary 
circumstances” justify revisiting the intervention issue.  
Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. Dep’t of Public Welfare of Pa., 701 
F.3d 938, 948-49 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying the law of the case 
doctrine to a subsequent motion for intervention).  We are 
satisfied that at this time, however, Gillette has not 
sufficiently demonstrated a divergence of interests that 
warrants intervention. 
